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ABSTRACT

Papers dealing with syntactic evidence in various languages for a higher performative sentence containing information about speaker, addressee and the speech act involved are reviewed and discussed. Arguments for this analysis have the form of showing that overt sentences behave in some way as if they were subordinate to a higher sentence containing a verb of "saying." Some processes related to this analysis depend on the NP's of the higher sentence. They include pronominalization processes which explain the status of overt first and second person pronouns, processes referring to real world facts which are assumed to be coded in the higher sentence, and processes concerning features of independent sentences which show them to be subordinated to a higher verb of saying, including the use of overt complementizers. While it is suggested that some information about the speech act and its participants needs to be expressed in the grammar, it is unclear whether the higher sentence is the best place for all these facts. That pragmatic knowledge affects utterance form in many languages should not necessarily be used as an argument for the universality of higher sentences. Universality is neither mandated nor precluded by the facts now in evidence. (Author/CLK)

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SURVEY PAPERS

Crosslinguistic Evidence for the Higher Sentence Analysis: A Review of the Literature*

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Carol Farwell

1. Introduction: Purpose and scope

The purpose of this paper is to review and characterize the types of crosslinguistic evidence which have been mentioned by various investigators for the syntactic reality of the higher sentence or performative analysis. To begin with it is useful to summarize the recent history of the higher sentence analysis, to suggest the nature of possible linguistic evidence and counter-evidence, and to discuss the relevance of crosslinguistic data to this analysis.

1.1 The higher sentence or performative analysis. It seems intuitively true that language is most generally spoken by a speaker, spoken to an addressee, and spoken with the wish to communicate something. Bally, for instance, notes that declaratives have a logical sense which includes this wish to communicate, even though that part of an utterance is not expressed:

> "si la phrase La terre tourne signifie logiquement «Je vous fais savoir (communication) que je suis convaincu (modalité) que la terre tourne», on ne s'étonne pas que l'on ne trouve presque jamais d'expressions chargées de cette double et pesante armature." (Bally 1944, 50)
>
> (This quotation is mentioned in Hetzron 1971. Bally's notion of a modality constituent, although theoretically just as important, is not considered in the papers surveyed below.)

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More recently, Austin (1962) discusses the differences between performative utterances, such as I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth, which cannot be true or false in traditional philosophical terms, and constative utterances, such as This ship is named the Queen Elizabeth, which traditionally have truth value. Austin finds that performative utterances are speech acts which perform the act named by the verb as they are uttered (in the first person, indicative, present tense by a person conventionally authorized to perform the act, etc.). He concludes, however, that constatives are also like performatives in that they perform an act of stating or declaring something, but that their performative marking is implicit.

Since Austin's work, grammarians have made attempts to incorporate an implicit higher sentence, such as those suggested by Bally and Austin, into the actual syntactic structure of sentences. Harris (1965) is apparently the first to suggest this. One type of transformation which he discusses is named "Dropping of Performative Operators". He is particularly concerned with imperative and question sentences in ENGLISH, which he believes to be related to sentences with performative operators which, if deleted, leave certain intonations on their kernels.

Boyd and Thorne (1969) use a somewhat similar analysis to explain the performative force of sentences with modal verbs such as You may go (permission). They suggest this sentence has a deep structure like I permit [you go].

Ross (1970) is the first to look for syntactic evidence that the higher sentences assumed by Bally, Harris, and Boyd and Thorne are in fact present at some point of the derivation of a sentence. He is also the first to extend this type of analysis consistently to declarative sentences, although others have done so independently (e.g. Hetzron 1971).

Ross's main contention is that every sentence has exactly one highest verb with performative force. This performative sentence is sometimes present on the surface -- in the explicit performatives

described by Austin as well as in such sentences as I tell you that this ship is named the Queen Elizabeth. More often, the higher performatives corresponding in force to ENGLISH statements, questions and requests are deleted. His argument is weakened by the fact that many of the processes he attributes to the presence of a higher sentence in declarative sentences also occur in explicitly performative sentences which Ross would claim to have no higher sentence. Furthermore, various people have shown most of his syntactic analysis to be misguided (see especially Fraser 1971, and Anderson 1970).

A somewhat similar analysis of ENGLISH is made by Jerrold Sadock (1969a). Beginning with a wish to give some motivated inner structure to the Q and IMP sentence-type markers postulated by Katz and Postal (1964), Sadock uses evidence from several languages other than ENGLISH to motivate a higher sentence ("hypersentence") much like Ross's. He does not attempt to account for the performative nature of the higher verb (although he later attempts to make additions to his theory for this purpose -- 1969b) but he does avoid many of Ross's problems by assuming that hypersentences are always deleted.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the relative merits of the Ross and Sadock theories or their reformulations. For our purposes, the performative nature of the higher verb will be ignored and the terms higher sentence analysis and performative analysis will be used interchangeably. In addition, it will be assumed that Sadock is correct in proposing that the higher sentence is always deleted. No philosophically oriented discussions of speech acts will be reviewed (e.g. Searle 1970). Also to be ignored are explicit performative verbs (e.g. promise, christen) and proposed grammatical constraints on performatives (e.g. embeddability) even though such constraints have been the basis for some arguments for higher sentences (Lakoff 1969, for one).

1.2 Possible linguistic evidence and counter-evidence. Those who maintain the higher sentence analysis are making claims on different levels of abstractness, only one of which will be considered here. At the most abstract level, the claim is that the unmarked use of language is for communication and that other expressive or ritualized uses of language are separable from the normal case. This claim will be accepted for this paper.

On a second level, the claim is made that the speech act and whatever information is relevant should be indicated on a sentence level rather than a larger (discouse) or smaller (subsentential) level. Again, this is not a necessary truth, and there are even some counterexamples, as when the identity of the addressee changes in mid-sentence (John knows that song, don't you, John.) or when Donald Duck's three nephews join forces to say one sentence, a different speaker for each phrase. More seriously, there seems to be no evidence one way or another for the discourse vs. sentence analysis, but the sentence level analysis will be assumed for this paper.

Given this assumption, one might still maintain either that such information must be syntactic or semantic in nature. All of the papers reviewed here assume that the higher sentence is a syntactic as well as a semantic phenomenon and that it therefore may affect the rest of the sentence according to regular syntactic processes. It is these syntactic effects of proposed higher sentences which constitute the crosslinguistic evidence reviewed here. No papers concerning solely semantic evidence will be reviewed.

More specifically, on the syntactic level, it is assumed that information about the speech act is contained in a higher, superordinate sentence. This is not a necessary assumption, and one can imagine counter-evidence -- e.g. evidence that the information about the speech act should occur in a clause coordinated to the clause of the main sentence or that it should

be in a separate sentence altogether. All the papers reviewed here assume superordination and offer evidence for that analysis.

Given this analysis, it is difficult to think of what might be counter-evidence. The simple absence of evidence for a syntactic higher sentence does not constitute counter-evidence so much as lack of evidence. Only if one were writing a grammar for one language with no presuppositions of universals would a lack of evidence constitute counter-evidence.

In general, these papers give syntactic evidence that the grammatical form of a declarative sentence is something like this:



For questions, the higher sentence is something like I request that you tell me X in which X is a disjunction for a yes-no question (Ross 1970, 263).

Given this type of higher sentence, the general approach to cross-linguistic evidence would be to show that the overt sentence behaves in some way like a subordinate sentence, or more specifically, like the complement of a verb of saying. In the most general case, a grammatical process is shown to operate on a embedded sentence depending on the type of verb or identity of nouns in the matrix sentence. A rule is stated to cover such phenomena. Then, it is shown that the same process seems to operate in simple sentences in just the way one would expect if those simple sentences were subordinate to the type of sentence shown above. Thus, it makes the rule more general if it can apply to both cases as it can if a higher sentence is postulated. The

types of processes discussed are those which refer to the identity of the higher noun phrases (discussed in 2. below), those which refer to the verb of saying or requesting and the grammar of the complement it takes (section 3.), and cases in which higher sentences, if they can undergo processes such as conjunction, can be used to explain otherwise difficult facts about language (section 4.).

1.3 Relevance: the assumption of universality. A further important question about the performative analysis concerns universal validity. If syntactic evidence for a higher sentence analysis can be found in one or more languages, at what point is it valid to hypothesize the syntactic presence of such sentences in all languages?

Ross (1970), for instance, comments that there seems to be evidence similar to his in "many languages" whereas he knows of no counter-evidence in any language (although he neglects to mention what would constitute counter-evidence). At one point in his paper he maintains that syntactic evidence should be sought separately for each language, while at another point he suggests that the presence of a similar lexical cooccurrence restriction in ENGLISH and JAPANESE suggests the universal validity of the performative analysis. Finally, he is willing to suggest that his performative analysis allows him to make a more extensive universal hypothesis -- the "Universal Base Hypothesis".

Sadock (1969a) assumes the universal validity of his hypothesis in giving evidence of his analysis of ENGLISH from several other languages. Ross himself gives major evidence from ARABIC and suggests evidence from other languages in footnotes. Two of Ross's critics, Fraser (1971) Matthews (1972), reject this use of crosslinguistic evidence as misguided.

The process of constructing hypotheses of universality may be assumed to proceed as follows. First, a syntactic (semantic, phonological, etc.) process or construction is described, usually with relation to one language. Second, affirmative evidence for the same process or construction

is found in several other areally distinct, unrelated languages. Then, the hypothesis is made that the process or construction occurs in all languages. From that point on, although more affirmative evidence is welcome, the most theoretically interesting evidence is negative -- evidence which shows that that process or construction does not or cannot exist in a certain language.

In cases such as the higher sentence analysis in which it is difficult to describe just what would constitute disconfirming evidence, one might wish to be more cautious in taking the last step and assuming universality. Yet, we have seen that those who have discussed the performative analysis have always made such an assumption. Therefore, it is interesting to review the available crosslinguistic evidence with these facts in mind.

2. Processes dependent on noun phrases.

The first type of evidence for higher sentences concerns processes in simple sentences which depend on the noun phrases in higher sentences. If no higher sentence is postulated, first and second person noun phrases appear to have special status in simple sentences, but this special status disappears when the higher sentence is assumed. Three types of process are discussed:

1. general pronominalization
2. other processes concerning coreferentiality of noun phrases in independent or subordinate clauses
3. processes which depend on real world facts about the referents of noun phrases.

2.1 General pronominalization. In simple sentences, noun phrases referring to the speaker and addressee are ordinarily always pronominalized to first and second person pronouns, if they can occur on the surface at all. Only in speaking to young children do we allow ourselves to say things like Mommy will help baby with his shoe in which the

speaker and addressee are referred to in the third person.

Occasionally, other situations warrant such usage. One is when the speaker asserts his authority by referring to himself in the third person: The court is not amused, Mr. Kleindienst. This sentence also shows the possibility of addressing the addressee by name in a vocative expression.

A somewhat different use of third person to refer to the addressee is shown in languages such as SWEDISH in which for every speaker there are many people who cannot be addressed by either of the two second person pronouns, but who must be addressed by name, kinship term, title, or the third person singular pronoun. Thus, a speaker might say Vill Oscar sätta sig en stund, "will Oscar seat himself a moment?", 'Will you sit down for a minute (said to someone named Oscar)?' This sentence is not equivalent in usage to a sentence with a vocative: Vill du sätta dig en stund, Oscar, 'Will you sit down a minute, Oscar?' in that there are social situations in which the first but not the second is possible.

If a speaker cannot for social reasons use a pronoun but does not know the addressee's name, he may refer to him with a third person pronoun or even a "joking" third person noun -- Är vikingen hungrig? "Is the viking hungry?" 'Are you hungry?' (Lind 1971). A somewhat similar case is found in GERMAN with titles -- Was wünschen der Herr Leutnant? 'What do you wish, Lieutenant?' Third person address may also be used in polite requests in ENGLISH -- Mr. Kleindienst will kindly leave. This form is probably only used when someone else is in the room to whom the utterance is addressed, but the kindly seems to indicate that Mr. Kleindienst is the intended addressee, i.e., the sentence is a request and not a simple prediction.

If we accept, however, that the normal situation is for first and second person reference to be either pronominal or absent from the sentence, what does this say for the higher sentence analysis? If the

higher sentence contains nouns referring to the speaker and addressee, any noun referring to t. se principals of the speech act in the lower sentence will be subject to normal pronominalization processes which have been shown to obligatorily pronominalize certain third-person forms, allowing us to generalize those rules to cover all pronominalization. Furthermore, there will be no need to specify nouns (at least singular nouns) for person in the deep structure, since all nouns coreferential with the highest subject will become first person pronouns, etc.

Although the noun phrases of a higher sentence will e convenient for these purposes, they are certainly not made necessary by the existence of first and second pe.son pronouns since there are third person pronouns which still do not take part in the processes. Third person pronouns often occur without prior reference in a sentence and may occur without prior reference in a discourse, yet no one has suggested that higher sentence noun phrases be used to account for them. The only difference between the two cases is that the reference of first and second is determinable, at least in singular number, with reference to participants in the speech act, whereas third person need not be so determinable.

2.2 Other processes concerning coreferentiality. Many of Ross's (1970) arguments concern the rule generality of processes depending on coreferentiality. Most of these arguments deal with the formation of reflexive pronouns in ENGLISH and have been successfully questioned elsewhere, although the argument type remains valid and could be applied to other languages as well as ENGLISH. One of his arguments is of a slightly different type and has been applied crosslinguistically.

Ross notes that it is odd to have the verb lurk in a sentence with a first person subject -- ?I was lurking near your house last night. However, after looking at further sentences -- John says I was lurking near your house last night, ?John says he was lurking near your house last

night, Ross suggests that the restriction is not on the first person subject but on the coreferentiality of the subject of lurk with the subject of the next higher verb of saying. If this is the correct generalization, then the oddness of the first example will be accounted for if a higher sentence is postulated, since the first person subject of lurk will necessarily be coreferential with the subject of the verb of saying in the higher sentence. Many ENGLISH speakers do not share these intuitions about lurk, but it is useful to use the lurk example to characterize evidence from other languages, as the argument about lurk by those who do agree with Ross is familiar.

As for crosslinguistic evidence, Ross notes (fn. 29) that there is a bound morpheme in JAPANESE, -garu, which, when added to any of a set of adjectives, converts that adjective into a verb (omosiroi 'interesting'; omorosirogaru 'to feel interested (in something)'). Like ENGLISH lurk, verbs in -garu cannot occur with first person subjects in simple sentences, and, when embedded, they cannot occur with subjects coreferential with the subjects of higher verbs of saying. From his description, the cases seem parallel in every way.

Another parallel case is presented for KOREAN by Lee and Maxwell (1970) who give three constructions which can occur only with first person subjects. Their first two examples concern the future morpheme kess and a particle ma which converts a statement to a promise. The following examples are illustrative: for kess, na ka ka kess ta, "I-SM-go-will-DEC", 'I will go.' This construction with kess cannot appear with pronouns in any other person or with personal names. For ma, na ka ka ma, "I-SM-go-promise," 'I promise to go.' again, the sentence ending ma can be used with no other person as subject. When in embedded sentences, however, these grammatical forms can be found in sentences with any person subject as long as that subject is coreferential with a higher verb of saying, e.g. kŭi ka ka kess ta ko mal-ha ass ta, "he-SM-go-will-DEC-COMP-say-TNS-DEC," 'He said that he would go.'

Therefore, the correct restriction seems to be directly comparable to the case of ENGLISH lurk.

The third example for KOREAN concerns a set of adjectives which can occur only with first person subjects (adjectives such as cold, hot, sleepy). When a verbalizing form, ə-ha is added to these adjectives ('to be or feel cold' etc.), they cannot occur with first person subjects. When embedded, sentences containing these adjectives act just as those described above. This case seems to cover the same phenomenon as that described for JAPANESE by Ross.

Lee and Maxwell extend their analysis of all three of these grammatical forms to interrogative sentences to show that such sentences must contain a higher indirect object you and a verb of asking. Similarly, they find that a sentence may contain the imperative marker ə-la just in case its subject is coreferential with the indirect object of a higher sentence whose verb is a verb of ordering. They also provide some evidence for a higher "propositive" performative for such forms as Let us go in KOREAN.

It has been argued by Anderson (1970) and by Fraser (1971), among others, that such facts are semantic in nature and should not be accounted for in syntactic terms. Because lurking is descriptive of another's action and not a deliberate act, it is odd to predicate it of oneself. Similarly, it is odd for me to tell you You have a headache, or for me to ask you Do I feel tired? Such feelings are known only to the person directly involved, and it is odd for me to ask you a question which only I can answer. A similar constraint is suggested by Lakoff (1969). Similar arguments can be made for the JAPANESE and KOREAN examples, as well as for many analogous examples which must exist in most languages. It does seem likely that many such words may include a common component of meaning, for instance [+ subjective]. Even if this component is semantic, however, it is relevant to the syntax of the languages

described and would have to be accounted for in syntax somehow.

Other syntactic facts which must make mention of first and second person are the following. In the ENGLISH sentence It seems to NP..., any noun or pronoun except you can be expressed. However, if no overt experiencer occurs, only me can be understood -- It seems that you're right. The same is true of other impersonal constructions, such as It is obvious, etc. A comparable example from FRENCH would be Il faut aller à six heures which cannot be used to say that some person other than the participants in the speech act should go at six o'clock but only that the speaker or the hearer or both must go then.

It seems then, that there are a number of syntactic constructions which are only well-formed according to certain coreferentiality conditions concerning a higher verb of saying and its subject and object, whether that higher information is expressed or not.

2.3 Processes which depend on real world facts. Sadock (1969a) takes an entirely different approach to establishing a special status for first and second person nouns. He describes two language phenomena which lead him to suggest a higher sentence analysis: morphologically marked gender agreement with the sex of the speaker or addressee, and respect language.

Sadock notes that some languages, such as YANA, have different word forms according to whether there is a woman involved in the conversation. Women speaking to women or men, or men speaking to women all use one set of word forms, while men speaking to men use a different form. These word form changes occur even when there are no overt morphemes specifying the sex of the speaker and addressee.

In DAKOTA, there are particles which occur optionally at the end of a sentence. Again, certain particles are appropriate for woman speakers while one particle is appropriate only for men. When a woman is reporting a man's speech, she will use the male particle at the end

of the report. Again, these particles occur even when there is no overt noun phrase referring to the speaker or addressee with which they may agree.

Ross (1970), at the end of his paper, gives two examples of this type. In THAI, every sentence must end with one of two particles which specify the sex of the speaker. The sentence he is coming, then has two separate forms depending on the speaker: khaw maa khráp - male, khaw maa kâ - female. In BASQUE, there is a morpheme in the verbal complex which agrees with the sex of the addressee.

Such agreement also takes place in overt first and second morphemes. Ross mentions that THAI has different first person pronouns depending on the sex of the speaker. SEMITIC, for one, distinguishes male and female in second person pronouns (Forchheimer 1953) as does SPANISH in first and second person plural pronouns.

Sadock's second type of evidence involves respect language. In JAPANESE, for instance, respect may be shown for the addressee even though there is no explicit morpheme referring to the speaker or addressee. The facts of KOREAN which Sadock also mentions are somewhat more mysterious since Sadock's account seems to differ from Lee and Maxwell's (1970). In general, it seems that there are two respect systems operating. In the first place, a speaker must choose a level of speech depending on the relative status of the speaker and the addressee. According to what speech level is chosen, certain characteristic pronoun forms and sentence endings will occur. In addition, the speaker may show respect to the subject of the sentence by the insertion of a form, si. Sadock hints that the decision about the use of si may also depend on the status of the addressee, but Lee and Maxwell do not mention such a restriction.

Sadock's form of argument about both types of example is the following:

> "The important point is that grammatical processes very commonly depend on some feature of the speaker and/or hearer even when these are not present in surface structure. On the other hand, I know of no example of third person noun phrases playing grammatical roles when they do not appear in surface structure. For example, I know of no language in which there is a grammatical difference depending on whether or not a 3rd person is being thought of but not being talked about .... I know of no language in which grammatical processes depend upon the time of day of the speech set or the presence in the environment of a tree, or the condition of the weather."
> (Sadock 1969a, 297)

Given that information about the speaker and addressee is exactly what is necessary to explain these facts, Sadock suggests that a higher sentence with the speaker as subject and addressee as indirect object provides a convenient place to indicate the sex or status of these participants so that processes of agreement can be used to account for the facts described.

There are two main questions which can be asked about this argument:

1. Is it true that only first and second person are relevant to grammatical processes when not explicit?
2. Even if this is predominantly true, does the use of a higher sentence such as has been described solve problems of the type Sadock describes?

With respect to the first question, it does seem that there are some obvious, although perhaps minor, exceptions. Sadock mentions one himself. He suggests that the presence of other people not participating in the conversation might affect the use of obscenities, as when obscenities are avoided in the presence of children (or parents). It seems intuitively reasonable that the presence of third person overhearers to the speech act might affect both the content of a message and its style. Conversation in the presence of an interviewer, an English teacher, or grandparents will tend to be more formal in style, even when they are not addressed directly, and people tend not to discuss "private" matters when others are around.

Models currently being suggested to account for different speech styles may have to take account of such third person factors as well as factors concerning the identity of the speaker and factors concerning the location of the speech act (e.g. church vs. home). Variation in speech style according to the sex of the speaker can also encompass much more elaborate differences than those mentioned by Sadock. One example is a dialect of MALAGASY described by Keenan (1972). In this particular culture it is considered bad form to say anything directly and males take great care to cultivate the art of indirect speech. Women, however, tend to ignore the norm and to say things directly. These differences are at some level a part of every speaker's competence, since speakers in this community can report how a woman might say something as opposed to how a man might say it.

There are several cases in which third person referents are treated in the same way as first and second. One trivial example is the respect which can sometimes be shown to third persons not directly mentioned. For instance, in phrases like his majesty's shoes or her majesty's car it would be extremely odd to claim that majesty is somehow marked with features which determine gender agreement on the possessive. Rather it seems that phrases like his majesty are simply respect markers referring to people not directly mentioned. Notice that phrases like this can generally only be used when their referent is uniquely determinable just as the referents of first and second person are uniquely determinable. Again, it might seem that the special status of first and second person has more to do with determinability than with presence in a higher sentence.

One major class of problems for both the correctness of Sadock's generalization and the adequacy of his solution has to do with language with an inclusive/exclusive distinction in the pronoun system. In the simplest form, the first person plural inclusive can be accounted for in

Sadock's terms as referring to just the speaker and the addressee, although in some systems it might refer to others as well. The first person plural exclusive, which includes 'I-and-he' or 'I-and-they' is immediately outside of Sadock's system. If the higher sentence subject is a first person singular noun, how is the extra third person information incorporated into the overt first person pronouns?

Forchheimer (1953) describes many pronominal systems which would not be easily accounted for in terms of higher sentences. For instance, one POLYNESIAN language, ROTUMAN, has an inclusive/exclusive distinction in the singular, dual and plural first person, while NOGOGU has such a distinction in the dual, trial and plural of the first person. In such languages, the exact number of persons being spoken of is relevant.

In other systems, information about the speaker must be incorporated into third person pronouns, a fact equally difficult for Sadock. KWAKIUTL and BELLA-BELLA contain third person pronouns with deictic distinctions for near first person, near second person and near third person as well as a further distinction between visible and invisible in each class and one further form denoting absence.

Deictic phenomena involving the choice of verbs in ENGLISH show that the kinds of information about speaker and addressee which are needed might not be a simple list of features. Lakoff (1970) suggests that the higher sentence should be expanded to include the place and time of the utterance (175), presumably to account for such deictic phenomena as those mentioned by Fillmore (1971a) -- here, this, now, today, etc. Knowledge of the place and time of the utterance will not account for more complicated deictic phenomena, however. Choice of the verbs come and go as described by Fillmore (1971b) depends on knowledge of the speaker and addressee's current locations, their "normal" locations, and their projected locations at some time in the future. Some of the relevant information in the following sentences is listed: Come to

San Francisco and I'll meet you there [speaker in Sausalito, addressee in Oakland], Come to the office tomorrow and we'll discuss it [speaker normally at office, but need not be when saying this], When you go to Palo Alto tomorrow .... [speaker not in Palo Alto now or tomorrow]. The number of further relevant conditions is staggering.

Even simple distinctions within the plural meaning of you in ENGLISH are hard to account for. What features in a higher sentence can account for the difference between you hurt each other and you hurt yourselves, especially considering that either of these sentences can be said to a single addressee?

One general conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no sharp distinction subjective I and the objective other in language phenomena, (and the position of you is even more tenuous -- some NEW GUINEAN languages contain only an I-other distinction in the pronoun system -- Wurm 1972). Third person information may be combined with I in first person plural pronouns, while information about the speaker (e.g. location) may be needed to determine a third person form. A general problem in determining the adequacy of Sadock's formulation is to determine just what "features" of the first and second person can be important for language. Another place to look for answers is in greeting phenomena.

Greeting routines are generally considered to be a separate language or cultural phenomenon and not normally covered by grammars, but a good case can be made for considering them just as much a part of a speaker's competence as sex-differentiated language or respect language. For instance, a speaker of SYRIAN ARABIC must echo the same tri-consonantal root when answering certain greetings (Ferguson 1967) and the use of greetings often interacts with the sex and respect phenomena which Sadock discusses.

Greetings in many ways seem to contradict Sadock's generalization. For instance, they often depend on the time of day (Good morning,) or

the condition of the weather (Nice day, isn't it?). Furthermore, greetings often take account of what the speaker or addressee is doing or has just done. In the Middle East, there is a special greeting used between males if one has just had a bath, a shave, or a nap. Different greetings are used to someone who is eating, working, etc. or to someone who is about to or has just undergone something dangerous to his health or safety.

In WOLOF, according to Irvine (1972), there is a rather rigid system of questions and responses in the greeting ceremony which must occur whenever two people meet. Just who originates the series, however, depends strictly on the status relation of the two greeters. This poses some problem for the higher sentence analysis since exactly the same kinds of status relation marked by respect language in JAPANESE and KOREAN is relevant in WOLOF, but they determine who will speak first rather than the form of the utterance.

Both in WOLOF and in JAPANESE and KOREAN a further problem arises. The determination of the features [+humble] and [+honored] which have been suggested by Lee and Maxwell (1970) to account for respect language is not a simple automatic process. Whether the speaker is assigned [+humble] or [+honored] in a given situation depends on the relative status of the speaker and addressee and changes according to the identity of the addressee or even according to the situation.

Sadock (1969a) seems to realize these problems and suggests listing features for sex, occupation, age, etc. under the higher nouns with the resulting forms depending on some sort of comparison of the two. However, a WOLOF of higher status will sometimes take a lower status role if he wishes to ask for a favor or if he feels that the other speaker is about to ask him for a favor. In addition, participants in WOLOF greetings may try to short-circuit the greeting process in order to change the status they have been attributed by the other speaker, and status specifications may change several times during a greeting sequence.

Again the central problem seems to be to delimit a set of "features" which can be attached to the nouns in the higher sentence to account for all these phenomena. Sadock suggests that there must a definite limit on such processes and that, specifically, features of age, sex, wealth and occupation may be important. Another example he admits is the number of generations separating speaker and addressee (relatives) which determines respect language in KIKUYU.

Ross is also concerned with the limits of relevance to language. He suggests an alternative analysis to his performatives -- the "pragmatic analysis" in which information about the speaker and addressee is thought to be "in the air" -- either determinable from context or part of the world knowledge of the speaker. Ross feels, however, that if the pragmatic analysis is to be used, "a precise theory would have to specify formally what features of the infinite set of possible contexts can be of linguistic relevance."

It seems wise, however, to accept Ross's rather futile suggestions about a pragmatic analysis rather than insisting on listing relevant facts as features on the nouns in a higher sentence. The types of "features" necessary to cover pronominalization, deixis, use of name and title and respect language range over much of the knowledge one person can have about another. Further, in WOLOF the greeting ceremony optionally includes asking about any relatives or friends of the other who can be named. It seems, then, that the job of specifying the linguistic relevance of world knowledge belongs in a theory of pragmatics and that the features which Sadock wishes to list are inadequate to do the job.

Fillmore (1971a) suggests that there are really two qualitatively different types of information needed:

> "There is, then, a distinction in semantic description of lexical items between references to properties of the higher clauses that contain them, on the one hand, and to features or participants in the speech act itself on the other hand. The former situation falls within the area of 'deep structure constraints' ... but the latter requires the availability of concepts related to the speech act."
>
> (Fillmore 1971a, 372)

According to this division, the information mentioned in section 2.2 above (parallel cases to ENGLISH lurk) are of the first sort and would be covered by deep structure constraints referring to the higher sentence. The cases in this section, however, are of the second type. They require reference to the speech act itself rather than a higher sentence. Some things could be handled by an extension of the form of the higher sentence, as suggested by Sadock (1969a) -- sex of the speaker, or Lakoff (1970) -- time and place of the utterance. Some more complicated cases (come, this, etc.) could not be so easily handled, and it is hard to characterize non-arbitrary dividing line between the two cases. It seems that if some cases of reference to the speech act itself cannot be handled by higher sentences, then perhaps all such cases should be handled in some other way.

3. Ways in which independent sentences act like complements of verbs of saying.

The second main type of evidence for the higher sentence analysis concerns evidence of subordination in independent sentences. It is reasonable to expect that, if sentences are derived according to the structure postulated by the higher sentence analysis, they might show some effect of having been a subordinate clause at some point.

The subordination argument has been somewhat misunderstood. For instance, Anderson (1970) points out that there is a "general failure of declaratives in almost all languages to show any of the peculiarities of embedding" (pg. 18). Specifically, he notes that languages such as GERMAN which have a special word order in subordinate clauses do not show that order in declaratives. In ICELANDIC, special processes depending on the identity of the subject of the main clause with the subject of the complement of a verb of saying do not take place between a deleted performative and its complement. Similarly in IGBO, the special set of pronouns used in reported speech is not used in declarative sentences (pp. 22-23).

This argument of Anderson's, however, misses the point. It has always been clear to grammarians that main and subordinate clauses are different in many ways, as well as being alike in many ways. If declarative sentences had all the marks of subordinate clauses, these marks would probably not be noticed as special markers of subordination. However, if a marker of subordination occurs optionally in non-subordinate sentences, or if it occurs in non-subordinate sentences of a particular type, then it would constitute evidence of deep subordination.

Three marks of subordination are discussed below. They are:

1. Declarative sentences with complementizers which occur after verbs of saying or with particles which occur in complements of verbs of saying
2. Yes-no questions marked by a subordinating conjunction
3. Wh-questions which share some features with relative clauses.

3.1 Declarative sentences with complementizers or particles. The best example of this type of evidence is one given by Ross (1970) which is worth discussing in some detail since some erroneous claims seem to have been made about it by both Ross and Anderson (1970). In CLASSICAL ARABIC (MODERN LITERARY ARABIC) there are three that complementizers. One, ʔan, is used after verbs denoting command, expectation or request. Another, ʔinna, is used after only one verb, ʔaquulu, '(I) say'. The third, ʔanna, is used elsewhere, including after other verbs whose meaning is similar to that of say.

The same form, ʔinna, is optionally present at the beginning of declarative sentences, and there are grammatical parallels in the two uses. When ʔinna is used after ʔaquulu, the subject of the following clause must follow it directly and must be in the accusative case. Similarly, when ʔinna begins a declarative sentence, the subject must com

next and be in the accusative case (contrary to Anderson's assertion that these subjects are in the nominative (17). Anderson's examples, however, are correct in their case marking.)

Anderson attempts to show that the two ?inna forms are not necessarily identical. For one thing, he mentions that no native grammarians have ever mentioned their identity, although this might just mean that they felt that the identity was too obvious to bother mentioning. In general, there seems to be no accounting for what a native grammarian will think worthy of mention about his language. Arab grammarians do comment at length about the fact that the accusative noun ending used after ?inna or ?anna is -a, the same as the subjunctive verb ending used after ?an.

Anderson might also have mentioned that current speakers often give explicit evidence that they do not recognize the identity of the two particles by using ?anna incorrectly after ?aquulu while retaining ?inna as a sentence introducer. Of course, these speakers are not native speakers of literary ARABIC in the sense that they have used it in every day life from an early age.

A more serious criticism of Anderson's pertains to particles which must be present in a declarative beginning with ?inna but which are not required in subordinates introduced by the same form. The examples for one particle, qad, are the following:

a. ?aquulu ?inna lwalada qad taraka lbayta
   "I say - that - the boy - past - leave - the house"
b. ?aquulu ?inna lwalada taraka lbayta
c. ?inna lwalada qad taraka lbayta
d. *?inna lwalada taraka lbayta
e. ?alwaladu qad taraka lbayta
f. ?alwaladu taraka lbayta

The a-b sentences and the e-f sentences are equally acceptable with or without qad, but sentence d is less acceptable than sentence c, showing that declaratives which begin with ?inna somehow require qad. (Sentences such as d are common in the spoken language, however.) Anderson gives a similar argument for another particle, la, but this argument seems to be totally misguided. One grammar suggests that la "sometimes" occurs in sentences beginning with ?inna, and that it is especially common when the predicate is separated from the subject noun by a relative clause or some other interposing phrase. The sentence without la is perfectly acceptable, however, It does not seem to me that these arguments show the non-identity of the two ?inna forms.

Finally, Anderson mentions the fact, which Ross seems not to recognize, that ?inna added to a declarative sentence gives that sentence extra force, where ?inna used as a complementizer adds no force. Again, although this fact needs explaining (and can probably be explained by showing that overt markers of declaration seem to add emphasis -- I tell you, you're wrong. being more emphatic than You are wrong.) it does not really argue against a higher sentence analysis. It seems, then, that there is evidence not only for a higher sentence in ARABIC, but also for a higher sentence containing a specific verb of saying.

There are similar but weaker examples in other languages. Ross mentions that in SPANISH, declaratives may optionally begin with que, in which case they have more emphasis. His example is (Que) mi gato se enratonó, 'My cat got sick from eating too many rats.' Que is, for SPANISH, also the main complementizer. Parallel constructions occur in other ROMANCE languages, but they add even more emphasis and are usually translated as exclamations, e.g. for FRENCH, Que la fille est belle, 'How beautiful the girl is!'

It is interesting to look at the ARABIC and SPANISH examples diachronically. It is fairly clear that ?inna originally meant 'behold'

and was originally used to add emphasis to declarative sentences, but it somehow became the complementizer for the unmarked verb of saying, ʔaquulu, and lost its emphatic meaning in those situations.

The exclamatory emphasis of que in FRENCH and the much lighter emphasis of que in SPANISH are not easily explained historically, since there seem to be two possible derivations.

Use of que in FRENCH corresponds to LATIN quam which is also exclamatory -- Quam fortis est, 'How brave he is.' Other uses of LATIN quam have become que in FRENCH, e.g. que 'than' in comparatives. If one looks at SPANISH, it seems that this use of que might also come from quod which was used after dico '(I) say' in VULGAR LATIN (Lakoff, 1968) -- Dico quod Marcus bonus est. 'I say that Marcus is good'. In such sentences, the dico might have come to be deleted. This quod is also the source of the que complementizer in both FRENCH and SPANISH. If que comes from quod, the history of que would be exactly the opposite of ARABIC ʔinna -- a complementizer appearing at the beginning of a sentence rather than a sentence introducer becoming a complementizer. It would be interesting to test whether contemporary speakers of ROMANCE languages identify the two que forms, one a sentence introducer 'how' and the other a complementizer 'that'.

It is interesting to note that in another ROMANCE dialect, BÉARNAIS, a particle que is one of four utterance particles, one of which occurs with every sentence. Que is the utterance particle used in unmarked declaratives -- Que m'at diserá 'He will tell me.' L'aha qu'ey acabat 'The business is over.' Again, the origin of this particle is mysterious, and it is no longer identifiable with a complementizer (Bouzet, n.d.).

Some languages show particles rather than complementizers. Peterson (1969) mentions that in MORE a particle me which occurs after the principle verb of every declarative sentence is also obligatory in complements of verbs of saying, even if the result is a sentence with

two me's: a yeela me ti' bamb waa me, "he - say - PD - that - they - come - PD" (P=perfective, D=declarative), 'he said that they have come'. Parallel to the ARABIC example, this particle does not occur in complement of verbs of command or desire, even if the verb of command is the same as the above: a yeela me ti' bamb wa, "he - say - PD - that - they - come", 'he said for them to come'.

3.2 Yes-no questions. Parallel arguments have also been made for yes-no questions. Moravcsik (1971, 110) notes that in HUNGARIAN and WALBIRI, a subordinating conjunction which occurs in embedded questions (parallel to ENGLISH whether) also occurs optionally in independent questions. For HUNGARIAN, the examples are: megkérdeztem, (hogy) vajon kér-e "I asked - (that) - whether - he wants one - question" 'I asked whether he wants one/some'; vajon kér-e, 'whether - he wants one - question", 'Does he want one/some? (wondering) '. A similar use of whether to form questions with a sense of "wondering" occurs in GERMAN, where ob may begin a question, in which case the whole clause has subordinate verb-last word order, so that it appears that 'I wonder' was simply left off the beginning of the sentence. The HAUSA form koo, 'or' or 'whether' can also be used to form a yes-no question.

3.3 Wh-questions. As for wh-questions, Moravcsik (1971) notes, referring to Ultan (1969), that in a number of unrelated languages such as INDONESIAN, HUNGARIAN, the ROMANCE languages and ENGLISH, relative and question pronouns are morphologically identical or similar. This could be accounted for if questions were at one point subordinate clauses and especially if they were related to relative clauses.

This last claim is made specifically by Truitner and Dunnigan (1972) for OJIBWE even though this language does not seem to show morphological pronoun identity. They show first that OJIBWE wh-questions share certain features with subordinate clauses: the verb has a subordinate ending and wh-questions use the subordinate negation form.

Furthermore, wh-questions share with relative clauses a certain vowel change in the verb as well as certain other structural changes marking focus. Finally, they show that question words themselves share some properties with both nouns and verbs and therefore should be derived from a complex higher sentence.

A similar claim is made for ZAPOTEC by Rosenbaum (1972). He finds that there is a similar constraint against the occurrence of the "determined future" aspect in relative clauses and wh-questions (as well as negatives) and shows that the same movement rule operates in forming relative clauses and wh-questions in ZAPOTEC.

In general, evidence of subordination in independent sentences presents a potentially convincing source of evidence for the performative analysis. It may be accidental that ?inna and que have the form of complementizers in their languages, but if similar evidence could be found in other languages the chance explanation would lose its power.

4. The conjunction of performatives.

This section presents one main example of odd language facts which become explainable if performative utterances are assumed and, furthermore, are allowed to conjoin. The best example of this kind of evidence concerns MORE (Peterson 1969).

As mentioned above, MORE has a particle me in every declarative sentence. There are two kinds of conjunction in MORE -- "dependent", in which a sequential or simultaneous time relation between two sentences is expressed, and in which only one me occurs, and "independent", in which no particular relation is expressed, and in which me occurs in both clauses. There are also two and-words which are distributed as follows:



Peterson suggests that me marks the existence of a higher performative. If so, independent conjunction, with more than one me, can be seen as the conjunction of performative sentences whereas dependent conjunction occurs within the complement of the higher sentence.

Since two higher sentences spoken by one speaker will necessarily have the same subject, a simple statement of the distribution of the two and-words can be made: la occurs in case the sentences being conjoined have the same subject, whereas ti occurs if those subjects are different. Peterson's paper contains more evidence relevant to this claim and is worth looking at.

Moravcsik (1971) suggests that performative conjoining can be used to explain the difference between "focused" and "non-focused" or in ENGLISH accounting for the differences between Did John appear or was he sick? and Did John appear or write a letter (or not)? In the first, the answer must correspond to one of the options mentioned, while in the second, the answer may include either or both or neither of the suggestions.

Sadock (1970, 1971) suggests that conjoining of unlike performatives gives rise in ENGLISH to "whimperatives" and "queclaratives" which have a mixed performative force. For example, Did you know that John was here? results from the conjoining question and declarative higher sentences. Such utterances have been described in different terms by Gordon and Lakoff (1971) and by Heringer (1972).

Again, it would be nice to see evidence comparable to the MORE example from other languages, or even to see evidence that other languages have queclaratives and whimperatives.

5. Further possible evidence. There have been many other arguments made for the performative analysis in ENGLISH which have not been exploited crosslinguistically. A few of them will be mentioned here, along with some related areas that have not been discussed.

One type of evidence for ENGLISH which has not been studied cross-linguistically concerns grammatical processes which can take place either in independent sentences or in the complements of verbs of saying. One example given by Lakoff (1970, 167-70) is topicalization: Egg creams, I like, He says that egg creams, he likes. A generalization about the use of topicalization would include the identity of the sentence subject and the subject of the higher verb of saying as well as the nature of that higher verb. Other processes said to be similar are the preposing of never and the use of so for emphasis: Never have I seen such impudence, He did so eat the hot dog.

Sadock uses his hypersentences to analyze direct quotation. Every direct quote has a hypersentence immediately above it, and the reference of first and second person pronouns within the quotation is determined by the speaker and the addressee in that hypersentence.

Sadock gives one example of reported speech in HINDI which is ambiguous -- əšok ko malūm hua ki mɛ̃ pas hua which means either 'Ashok came to know that I (the speaker) passed the exam' or 'Ashok came to know that he (Ashok) passed the exam', mɛ̃, the first person pronoun, is ambiguous. This example seems to show a neutralization of direct quotation and reported speech in HINDI. A similar example from ENGLISH would be John said I won, which is possible to disambiguate by quotation intonation, but often occurs in a form which would

be ambiguous out of context. Whether the HINDI example is even more ambiguous is unclear. Both of these raise some questions.

What is the universal status of the distinction between direct and indirect reporting of speech? Is it universally possible to quote directly? Is it possible in every language to report speech indirectly? Furthermore, in various languages, do only verbs of saying allow the reporting of indirect speech or do verbs of knowing, believing or feeling behave in the same way? Many people have noticed that the sentence John thinks we should leave now. reports an implied act of communication -- John telling the speaker what he thinks.

The HINDI example may lead to some other interesting findings. Cantrall (1969) for instance, argues that the pitch and stress of certain nouns and associated verbs is determined by the grammatical roles of their antecedents. In particular, he also claims that first person pronouns and associated verbs have the stress appropriate to a sentence subject no matter where they appear, implying that that pitch was assigned to the subject of the higher sentence. This allows us to resolve certain ambiguities. For instance, the deleted object of wash in It might be fun to wash in the fountain, which could be myself, yourself or ourselves, among others, will be determinable according to the pitch on wash.

Cantrall claims, furthermore, that similar pitch determination operates in other languages such as FINNISH and even CHINESE and other tone languages. Although his evidence is not clearly right, even for ENGLISH, it would be interesting to apply his theory to the HINDI example to see if it will disambiguate there.

Finally, a number of adverbial phrases have been noted (by Ross, Lakoff, and others) which seem to be constituents of the higher sentence rather than constituents of sentences they appear with. A listing of one type of these adverbial phrases is given by Rutherford (1970). Such phrases often refer to the relationship between the former discourse and the

speech about to occur (e.g. in addition, in short, in a word, on the contrary, for example, for the record), or they name a topic (with reference to ...). Again, it would be interesting to study such phrases crosslinguistically, to consider their limits and universality.

Lakoff (1970) also mentions examples such as Why is John leaving, since you know so much? in which the since-clause seems to modify nothing in the sentence but seems to indicate my reason for asking you -- a meaning which would be easy to capture if the adverbial clause were a constituent of a higher sentence in the deep structure.

6. Summary.

It is generally agreed that, pragmatically, some thing like a higher sentence is present for every utterance in every language. We have reviewed the evidence that this higher sentence is present syntactically in various languages. It has been shown that some evidence which has been given about the special status of first and second person is largely unconvincing, but that cases parallel to ENGLISH lurk and it seems (to me) are more promising. Evidence of the subordination of independent sentences to a verb of saying looks even more promising and should be sought.

The relation of all this to the hypothesis of universality is less clear. The evidence is probably convincing enough so that those inclined to accept the universality of higher sentences will feel comfortable, but it is scanty enough so that those not inclined to do so will not. Surely, everyone would agree that more clear evidence from a wider range of languages would be useful, both in making the evidence more convincing and in making clearer the properties of higher sentences.

Finally, an analysis of grammatical phenomena which seem likely to interact with higher sentences would be useful at this point. Crosslinguistic studies of the distinction between direct and indirect quotation, the relationship between reported speech and reported thought, and the types of adverbial phrases which refer to the speech act and the discourse are needed and have enough intrinsic interest to warrant being done.

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